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Iarocci: Second Battle of Ypres

1st Canadian Infantry Brigade
in the Second Battle of Ypres
The Case of 1st and 4th Canadian
Infantry Battalions, 23 April 1915
Andrew Iarocci

T

he Great War began in August 1914 as a war
of movement, but after three months of
maneuver battles the conflict assumed a different
form on the Western Front. As flanks were closed
during the “race” to the sea, opposing lines of
armies began to solidify into static positions.
The quick resolution that many contemporary
observers had imagined would settle the war
before Christmas was nowhere in sight, and
with the onset of winter, there was little activity
in the west. In the meantime the Germans won
significant victories on the Eastern Front, but
with the return of campaigning weather in the
spring of 1915, their attention returned to the
situation in France and Belgium. In order to
divert attention away from troop movements
to the east, the German command decided to
launch a limited offensive to reduce the Ypres
Salient in April 1915. This was not intended as
a war-winning attack, but it presented a double
opportunity to test new chemical weapons
and keep the Allies on the defensive. While the
Germans were eager to reduce the Salient, the
Allies were equally determined to defend it. Ypres
was one of few Belgian towns that remained
unoccupied and it had become an important
symbol of Allied resistance since the First Battle
of Ypres in 1914. It was also a gateway to the
channel ports and the British were not prepared
to let these fall into German hands.

perspectives, Second Ypres was a difficult fight
not only due to the presence of chemical agents
on the battlefield, but because British, French
and Canadian troops were reacting to a German
initiative. Such circumstances must have made
those April days especially chaotic for Canada’s
largely untested soldiers. It is now recognized
that the Germans lacked the local resources
necessary to sustain a breakthrough at Ypres
in the wake of their 22 April attack, but Allied
commanders operating without the benefits of
hindsight interpreted the enemy’s advance as
a palpable threat to the security of the Salient.
The first German gas cloud was directed against
French troops who occupied the northeastern
edge of the Salient. The defenders, who were not
equipped with respirators, fell into disorder as
choking men attempted to escape the greenishyellow gas cloud. To the immediate right of the
French, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades
fought desperately to prevent the Germans from
encircling the Allied line. Meanwhile, a polyglot
of Allied units rushed forward to close the gap
left by French troops who were driven back by
the initial gas attack. Many of the fresh British
and Dominion formations thrown into a series
of counterattacks during the following few days
would suffer appalling casualties, not from the
gas itself, but from conventional small-arms and
artillery fire.1

The Second Battle of Ypres is widely remembered
as the debut for chlorine gas on the Western Front,
but it was also the introduction to pitched battle
for the officers and men of the First Canadian
Contingent. From the Allied and Canadian

During the night of 22-23 April, 1st Canadian
Infantry Brigade marched out of its reserve billets
to help deal with the crisis at the front. In the
dawn hours of 23 April a counterattack by 1st
and 4th Infantry Battalions was launched against
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Left: Lieutenant-Colonel A.P. Birchall, commanding
officer of the 4th Battalion from 29 January 1915 until
his death on 23 April.
Inset: A cap badge of the 4th Canadian Infantry
Battalion (Central Ontario).
Below: Birchall’s training manual, Rapid Training of a
Company for War. This is the third edition, printed in
March 1915.

accuracy. A careful examination of the evidence
suggests that, notwithstanding the unfavourable
circumstances referred to by Morton, the officers
and men of the 1st Canadian Contingent learned
a great deal about warfare during the months they
spent training in England and France between
October 1914 and March 1915.

new German positions established along the eastwest line of Mauser Ridge. The attack, designed to
stabilize the front, lasted for most of the daylight
hours of 23 April. Upon first examination it seems
to conform to the stereotype of “unprepared”
Canadians being thrown haphazardly into
hopeless battle that is so often associated
with the earlier war years. Standard historical
interpretations of the Canadians’ participation at
the Second Battle of Ypres argue that inadequate
and incomplete training were chiefly responsible
for high Canadian casualties and loss of ground.
Military historian Desmond Morton has noted
that “serious training” for the Canadians
prior to Second Ypres was limited by weather,
leave, sickness and a shortage of instructors.2
Historian Bill Rawling, in his landmark study of
trench warfare, contends that in early 1915 “the
Canadians were not yet ready for the kind of war
that had been thrust upon them.”3 There is some
truth to these statements, but they do not sum
up the first few months of the war with complete

Upon arriving in England in late October 1914
a standard training syllabus was prepared
for Canadians to follow. 4 This training was
supplemented in France when Canadian
companies and battalions were paired off with
more experienced British units during rotations
through quiet sectors of the front. Special
attention was devoted to the preparation of
defensive positions in the dark, the crossing of
wire obstacles, cooperation of all arms in the
attack, and resupply in the field.5 Prior to leaving
England for France, 1st Brigade participated
in several days of brigade-level maneuvers that
involved scenarios not dissimilar to the real-life
situation that 1st and 4th Battalions would find
themselves in on 23 April.6 Overall, the training
undertaken by the Canadians prior to their
first major battle was quite sophisticated and
not simply a matter of squad drill and bayonet
practice.
Beyond routine
drill and exercises,
Canadians were
privy to the latest
lessons from the
front through the
pamphlets and
manuals that were
being produced
by Captain S.G.
Partridge’s
British Army
Printing and
Stationary
Depot
in
ever greater
numbers.7
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There is no question that the counterattack of
23 April was extremely costly for 1st and 4th
Battalions; 1st Battalion suffered more than 400
casualties and 4th Battalion lost approximately
500 men.12 Although neither unit was able to
capture its terrain objective on 23 April, the
counterattack was successful in the sense that it
helped to prevent the Germans from advancing
on Ypres and cutting off the Salient. Contrary
to the standard interpretation, there is little
evidence to suggest that insufficient training
caused high numbers of casualties or unduly
influenced the outcome of the counterattack.
Contemporary sources clearly show that 1st
and 4th Canadian battalions displayed a great
deal of skill in their first major battle. A careful
examination of message logs, after action reports,
and eyewitness accounts recorded at the time
indicates that the two battalions remained
in communication with each other, and with
higher level formations (brigade and division),
throughout the day. During their ordeal on the
battlefield, both battalions continued to function
under extreme fire according to their training
and, despite many officer casualties, including
the 4th Battalion’s commander, the troops did
not fall into disarray or quit the field in disorder.
Both units held their positions as best they could
until relieved late on the 23rd. Officers at brigade
and division headquarters attempted to secure
as much support as possible from neighbouring
infantry and artillery units.

Canadian Brigade was in reserve at Vlamertinghe,
about five miles to the west of Ypres. During the
night of 22-23 April, Generals H.C.O. Plumer, (5th
British Corps) and E.A.H. Alderson (Canadian
Division) decided that 1st Canadian Brigade,
specifically 1st and 4th Canadian Battalions,
would participate in an Allied counterattack
against the newly-established German line along
Mauser Ridge, which ran roughly west to east
on the northern edge of the shrinking Salient.
Both battalions were warned for action during
the evening of 22 April. As a result of the initial
German attack, French troops suffering the effects
of chlorine gas were falling back on Vlamertinghe
itself, along the very roads upon which 1st and
4th Battalions would march in order to reach
their starting lines for the counterattack.13 The
battalions moved out of reserve after midnight
and crossed over the Yser Canal on the Brielen
Bridge sometime between 0315 and 0410
hours.14 Good route march discipline probably
saved the Canadians from becoming hopelessly
entangled with retreating French soldiers and
various other bodies of troops heading one way
or another. Shortly after crossing the canal the
commanding officers of 1st and 4th Battalions

NAC PA 7380

Visiting British officers also arrived in the
Canadian camp to give lectures and answer
questions about the situation in France and
Belgium. 8 Some of these officers stayed on
permanently with the Canadians. One of them
was Captain A.P. Birchall, a veteran officer
with 14 years in the British Army’s 7th Royal
Fusiliers.9 Birchall was subsequently promoted
and assigned to command 4th Canadian Battalion
as of 29 January 1915.10 He was not only an
experienced officer, but also the author of Rapid
Training of Company for War, an instructional
manual reprinted three times during 1915.11

When the Germans launched their first gas
clouds on 22 April, Brigadier M.S. Mercer’s 1st
Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Hill, commanding officer of
the 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion in April 1915. He
is shown here later in the war as a Brigader-General in
command of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

7
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Above: The scene of the initial German gas
attack. This photograph was probably taken
shortly after the war.
Right: This photo, taken by the author in 2001,
looks northeastwards across the battlefield
from the Ypres-Pilckem Road. Mauser Ridge
is visible along the horizon, although the
upward slope of the land is barely discernable.
An extension of the A19 highway towards
Ostend will soon bisect this area, which has
otherwise changed very little since the Great
War.

were briefed by Brigadier Mercer.15
Lieutenant-Colonel A.P. Birchall (4th Battalion)
and Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Hill (1st Battalion)
were notified at 0443 hours on the morning
of 23 April that two French battalions on their
left flank would be launching a counterattack
toward Pilckem at 0500 hours. On the Canadian
front 4th Battalion would lead the assault with
1st Battalion in support. A single battery of 1st
Canadian Field Artillery (CFA) Brigade was to
fire in support of the Canadian battalions from a
position west of the Yser canal.16 The Canadians’
objective was the German line atop Mauser Ridge,
1,500 yards from the Canadian starting line. The
intervening space was largely open ground, with
a single line of hedges and willow trees bisecting
the area about halfway between the Canadian and
8
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German positions.17 The field sloped upward very
gradually to the top of the ridge line upon which
the Germans were dug in.
As of 0500 hours neither the French nor the
Canadian battalions had yet to move. The
reason for the French delay is unknown, but
4th Battalion’s axis of advance was temporarily
blocked by the Middlesex Regiment. At 0550
hours Mercer’s 1st Brigade reported to Alderson’s
headquarters that 4th Battalion would be passing
through the Middlesex Regiment in order to join
the French in the attack, which had still not
begun. Believing that the French were prepared
to attack on his left, Birchall launched his assault
sometime between 0550 and 0630 hours.18 1st
CFA was kept abreast of the battalions’ progress
through messages from 1st Brigade since it was
unlikely that the gunners would have been able
4
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At 0700 hours Lieutenant-Colonel Hill reported to
brigade that 4th Battalion was not in touch with
the French battalions that were supposed to be
advancing on the Canadian left. The Canadians’
right flank was in better shape, as a companysized force from the Middlesex Regiment was also
advancing.20 Within approximately 30 minutes
Birchall’s troops had managed to cover roughly
half of the distance toward the German trenches
on top of the Mauser Ridge and Hill felt confident
enough to report to brigade that “all goes well
so far.”21 This early optimism may have resulted

because the Germans held their fire until the
Canadians were within 600 yards of them;
shortly after Hill’s message was received, Birchall
reported that progress was slow and that the
enemy rifle fire was heavy.22 Hill then indicated
to brigade that Birchall requested reinforcements
and, accordingly, 1st Battalion was ordered to
advance to support 4th Battalion.23 By the time
that Hill’s message was received, brigade had
already signaled division that 4th Battalion was
stalled and had not established contact with
the French.24 At 0820 hours brigade requested
“urgent” artillery support for 4th Battalion, which
had clearly been pinned down by then.25 In the
absence of a French advance, division ordered
brigade to dig in next to the British on its right
and extend its line all the way to the canal line on
the left, an additional distance of nearly one mile.
The two Canadian battalions were expected to
fill the French vacuum between the Pilckem road
and the Yser.26 But as a result of heavy fighting
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to clearly observe the attack from their positions
on the opposite side of the Yser.19 No mention
is made in the sources of forward observation
officers being with the infantry battalions.
Instead, it appears that supporting fire was
requested by the battalion commanders through
their brigade headquarters, which in turn were
in contact with the CFA.

Hooge
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since daybreak, Birchall and Hill’s troops were
not strong enough to extend themselves leftwards
all the way to the canal line. Thus, Birchall
dispatched the following message, received by
brigade at 1050 hours:
Your message instructing us to stop advance
and dig in received. Whole line is now digging
in. Line extends from YPRES-PILKEM Road to I
think about 600 yds. East of road. Casualties are
heavy. MIDDLESEX are on our right and I do not
know exactly how far they extend. We reached a
point about 450x from German Trenches As all
my companies are up in line and I cannot well
move them to a flank in daylight I cannot extend
our road (line?) towards Canal unless absolutely
necessary. I am trying to find out situation
between road and canal. Have sent a message to
O.C. 1st Bn. giving your message and requesting
him to extend his line to the left of the road.27

open left flank he reported that only 100 men
from his company were available as reserves, an
entirely inadequate number to fill the gap left by
the French. Hill wisely dug in his reserve troops
toward the rear on a higher piece of ground from
which he could cover some of the gap and protect
the exposed Canadian left flank.28 Meanwhile,
Birchall ordered his men to dig in where they
were. A letter written by Captain Colquhoun,
of “B” Company, 4th Battalion, indicates that
the order was received by the forward troops,
noting that “we advanced to within 400 yards of
the Germans, when I received orders to go no
further until I received reinforcements. I had only
about half of my company left then.”29 Casualties
tapered off once the troops were dug in opposite
the Germans.

The problem of the open flank was apparently
solved just after 1100 hours when brigade
informed the Canadian
to Pilckem
battalions that the French
“now have five battalions
between you and the
canal...” 30 However, it
seems that the French
were well to the rear of
Canadian firing line, since
Birchall was still having
difficulty linking up them.31
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Charge of the 4th Canadian Battalion at Ypres - Lieutenant-Colonel Birchall
killed while leading his men as illustrated in The Times History of the War.

It was agreed that the Canadians and French
would resume their attack at the soonest possible
opportunity, although it is difficult to explain why
Canadian or French commanders believed that
the Germans were low on ammunition. If the
German fire died down, it was probably because
the Canadians had dug in and were presenting
fewer targets than they had during the initial
advance. In any case, the attack did not resume
immediately, as the Canadians waited for a cue
from the French which did not materialize before
1500 hours.35
The detailed message record ends at this
point, but the battalion war diaries and eyewitness
accounts of 4th Battalion soldiers indicate that
the Canadians did resume their attack during
the afternoon. An after-action report from 1st
Battalion states that at 1545 hours, Colonel A.D.
Geddes’ Buffs (East Kent Regiment) arrived and
joined the Canadian survivors in a fresh assault.
The Anglo-Canadian force was accompanied by
a French attack of undetermined strength on
the left. The 4th Battalion war diary reports that
prior to the second attack, Lieutenant-Colonel
Birchall took command of “C” Company after
its commander had been wounded. The second
attack succeeded in capturing a further 200 yards
before being halted by withering fire. At some
point during this final attempt to reach the enemy
trench Lieutenant-Colonel Birchall was killed,36
but the additional ground was held until later in
the evening when the Canadians were relieved

and withdrawn.37 Interestingly, an account from
the London Times corroborates this narrative,
although in highly compressed and stylized form:
It is safe to say that the youngest private in
the rank, as he set his teeth for the advance,
knew the task in front of him, and the youngest
subaltern knew that all rested upon its success.
It did not seem that any human being could live
in the shower of shot and shell which began to
play upon the advancing troops.
4th Canadian Battalion at one moment came
under a particularly withering fire. For a
moment--not more--it wavered. Its most gallant
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Birchall,
carrying, after an old fashion, a light cane, coolly
and cheerfully rallied his men, and at the very
moment when his example had infected them,
fell dead at the head of his battalion.38

The first paragraph of the Times report refers to
the initial phase of the attack, before the battalion
“wavered” and dug in at a range of 400 yards
from the crest of the ridge. The second paragraph
describes the resumed Anglo-Canadian-French
attack in which Birchall lost his life while leading
“C” Company.
Some of the 4th Battalion survivors insisted
that the objective was reached within two hours
of launching the original dawn attack. These
accounts present some difficulty, since it is
abundantly clear from official sources that the
objective was never reached. In all likelihood the
troops were not referring to the final objective,
11
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but rather, to German outpost lines which were
quickly overwhelmed under the weight of the
initial assault. Consider the following account
from Private A.W. Wakeling, of “B” Company, 4th
Battalion:
At 5 a.m. we were told to take a trench about
1,500 yards away. We had been lying down
behind a hedge, and we no sooner showed
ourselves than a terrible fire was opened up,
machine gun, rifle and shrapnel. It came from all
directions on our front and both flanks; our boys
went over in dozens...It took us just one hour to
take the trench the French had lost. Only 250 of
us were left and five officers. We lost about 700
men and 20 officers that morning...In my platoon
55 started and only 11 of us reached the trench.39

In the first place, Wakeling has overestimated
the casualties suffered by his battalion. In 4th
Battalion there were 18 officer casualties, while
487 other ranks were killed, wounded, or listed
as missing.40 It is also likely that German fire
did not reach a crescendo until the Canadians
advanced to a closer range, probably within 1,000
yards of the objective. This would explain why Hill
observed an initially smooth advance. Finally, the
trench to which Wakeling refers was not the main
objective, but more probably, a forward outpost
that the Germans quickly evacuated under the

weight of the Canadian attack.41 Wakeling further
explains that,
The worst was yet to come during the day. We
had no artillery behind us and we had to hold the
trench at all costs. The artillery started shelling
us right away to drive us out...Towards evening
our artillery came into action and reinforcements
from the British Army...”42

In fact, one battery of Canadian artillery was in
action throughout the day, but the men in the
ranks hardly would have noticed this modest
level of fire support in the midst of the punishing
volume of German artillery that was landing
on top of them. The friendly artillery to which
Wakeling refers as “coming into action” was
probably British or French. His last assertion
regarding reinforcements is correct and refers
to those arriving to support the second phase of
the attack.
Under the circumstances, there is little that
the officers and men of 1st and 4th Battalions
could have done differently from a tactical
standpoint to make the counterattack against
Mauser Ridge more successful. According to
A.F. Duguid’s account in the official history, the
initial advance was “carried out in the most
perfect order,” as the respective companies “leap-

12
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In this 1917 photo a Canadian soldier examines the grave marker of sapper
from 1st Field Company, Canadian Engineers who was killed at Second Ypres.
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frogged” toward their objectives during the early
morning hours of 23 April.43 At the same time,
battalion machine gunners attempted to lay down
suppressive fire with their Colt guns while the
rifle platoons moved forward.44 The battalion’s
initial advance conformed to guidelines indicated
in Rapid Training of a Company for War, which
outlined the techniques of fire and movement as
“the need for covering fire, (a) of one company or
platoon covering with its fire the advance of its
neighbours,” and “(b) of special detachments of
infantry posted, if possible, on a flank.”45 Birchall,
author of the training manual, made sure that
his troops were familiar with these techniques.
Eyewitness accounts confirm the “leap-frogging”
described by Duguid; according to Private Albert
Adams of “B” Company, he and his fellows would
advance about 25 yards at a time, taking cover
intermittently.
Anyone who visits the battlefield today can
easily observe that the Germans enjoyed full
advantages of terrain. The ground is very flat
and, in early 1915, would not yet have been
shelled into the interminable quagmire so often
associated with the Ypres Salient during the later
war years. As Private Frank Betts noted shortly
after participating in the action, the battlefield
was “as level as a billiard table.”46 A sketch map
of the field drawn by someone from 1st Battalion
shows that willow trees bisected the battlefield,
and soldiers’ letters speak of hiding behind
hedges prior to advancing, but this vegetation
offered little cover once the assault troops passed
the middle of the battlefield.47 From that point
northward the ground rises almost imperceptibly
up to the crest of Mauser Ridge. The difference
in elevation is only really noticeable as one
descends along the Pilckem road, but clearly
the Germans were able to look down upon the
vulnerable attackers and fire at will from their
well-constructed “loop-holed” positions.48
It is tempting to criticize Birchall for
launching the attack without having contacted the
French on his left flank and without a preparatory
bombardment. Yet Birchall had orders to attack
and the message logs show that the Canadian
force was expected to cooperate fully with its
Anglo-French counterparts. As far as Birchall
knew, the British and French forces on his flanks
were also going to participate as planned. In
the face of uncertainty about French intentions

Birchall could only delay for so long, as precious
minutes of darkness were running out with the
approach of dawn on the morning of 23 April. As
the sky grew lighter Birchall faced a conundrum
experienced by countless other battalion
commanders throughout the First World War:
go, wait, or stay put? With time running short,
clear orders from above, and the understanding
that the Salient was in grave danger, it is not
difficult to understand Birchall’s decision to
advance. Nor was this a case of the stereotypical
hide-bound commander thoughtlessly ordering
his troops forward to meet certain death.
Birchall lead the attack personally, and then
assumed responsibility for “C” Company when its
commander was incapacitated. In a letter home
Frank Betts wrote:
I suppose you saw in the papers about the 4th
(Battalion). Our Col. Birchall was killed. He sure
was a brave man. He went up the field just as if
there was not a war on, and the bullets, shrapnel,
Johnsons and war shells were as thick as hail…49

Like so many of his soldiers, Birchall’s decision
cost him his life, but it is difficult to conceive a
better course of action he might have taken under
the circumstances of 0530 hours, 23 April 1915.
The search for blame inevitably turns next
to commanders at brigade, division and beyond,
for ordering a “suicidal” frontal attack and for
failing to properly liaise with flanking units. The
former criticism has been levelled against British
and French commanders many times during
the last 80 years, but once again, the reader
is challenged to come up with an alternative
course of action under the circumstances. With
most of Belgium already occupied, Ypres was
an important political symbol for the Allies,
particularly since the British Expeditionary Force
had made its stand there back in the autumn
of 1914. Strategically, Ypres was a gateway to
the channel ports that needed to be defended
in order to protect British supply routes. Allied
leaders elected to stand their ground and senior
commanders were compelled to function within
these parameters. As the German attack gained
ground under a cloud of chlorine gas, hints
of panic appeared in the Allied ranks. It was
deemed necessary to counterattack, throw the
enemy off balance, and gain time to reinforce.
Senior officers did their best to re-shape plans
in this fluid situation. Thus, there was no
13
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Top: The Poperinge Old Cemetery, located a few kilometers west of Ypres, is the resting place of some of the Canadians
killed at the Second Battle of Ypres. Inset left: 26-year-old Private I.H. Murray of Moncton, NB died sometime between
23 and 30 April 1915. He is buried in Essex Farm Cemetery, only a few metres from Dr. John McCrae’s dressing station
on the west side of the Yser Canal. Inset centre: Private G. Harrison was a 35-year-old veteran of the South African
War who was killed on 23 April 1915. He is buried in Poperinge Old Cemetery. Inset right: Lieutenant H.B. McGuire,
of Orangeville, ON, died of wounds on 24 April 1915 and is buried in Poperinge Old Cemetery.

demand from above that Birchall carry through
the initial assault at all costs once it had gone
to ground before reaching its objective. When
Canadian Divisional headquarters learned of the
high losses that Birchall’s force was suffering, it
ordered 1st Brigade to dig in and await further
reinforcement. After receiving these orders from
brigade, Birchall and Hill acted accordingly.

The issue of liaison is more problematic. With
Canadian, British and French units operating
side by side in a relatively contained space, the
coordination of effort posed a special challenge.
Cooperation between Canadian and British
formations was facilitated to some degree by the
fact that Alderson’s Canadians were part of the
British chain of command. While the experiences
of 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades in

14
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the Second Battle of Ypres show that relations
between Canadians and their British cousins
were not always completely harmonious, it
appears that 1st and 4th Battalions operated well
in conjunction with the various British regiments
behind them and to their right, including the
Middlesex and the Buffs.
The situation on the Canadians’ left was far
less secure. Not only was the flank left open to
attack by the Germans, but the absence of any
French activity between the Pilckem Road the
Yser Canal allowed the Germans to concentrate
their fire against the Canadian battalions. The
message logs repeatedly state that contact existed
with “French headquarters,” but there is nothing
more specific to indicate which unit or echelon
of command these headquarters belonged to.
Throughout most of his final few hours Birchall
was out of touch with what forces existed on
his left flank and the accuracy of information
on French strengths and dispositions coming
from Mercer’s and Alderson’s headquarters is
questionable at best. If liaison between front
line units had been more securely established
before dawn, it is possible that the attack might
have succeeded in reaching the German line. But
the Canadians had been marching all night to
reach their lines and time was short. Language
barriers exacerbated tenuous liaison, and there
was simply not time for Birchall to personally
confirm what his superiors told him to be true.
Such action on his part may have delayed the
counterattack until nightfall, which would have
given the Germans more than 12 additional
hours to bring supplies forward and strengthen
their new defences on top of the ridge.
Costly experiences such as those of 1st
and 4th Battalions at Second Ypres have too
often been interpreted as evidence that the
“unprepared” Canadian Expeditionary Force had
much to learn before it would become the elite
Dominion shock force of 1917-1918. Yet this
analysis of operations on 23 April 1915 suggests
that factors such as time, terrain, liaison, the
introduction of chemical weapons, perceptions
of enemy intentions, strategic considerations,
and emergency circumstances conspired against
Canadian soldiers in their first serious encounter
with the enemy. Conversely, the training that
Birchall and Hill’s men had received in England
and France probably saved them from falling
into chaos and being completely destroyed in

the open. The soldiers of 1st Brigade were welltrained by 1915 standards, and it is doubtful
that any other two battalions could have achieved
more than the 1st and 4th Canadians. Lessons
were absorbed at Second Ypres, but there was
no secret formula that could save battalions from
suffering high casualties or painlessly overcome
the myriad challenges posed by Western Front
battlefield environments between 1914 and 1918.
The Second Battle of Ypres was an unforgiving
introduction to combat for the men of 1st and
4th Canadian Infantry Battalions. The battles of
1916, 1917 and 1918 were not going to get any
easier.
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